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Abstract
In pay-per-bid auctions, placing a bid costs a fee, and only raises the price of the item by a small increment. At
the conclusion of the auction, the last bidder wins, and the price paid by the winning bidder is subsidised by the
bidding fees paid by unsuccessful bidders. In this short paper, the first publicly available analytics of data from a
pay-per-bid website are presented. We present a visual analysis approach using a specific tool developed for the
purpose. This dataset represents a difficult challenge because it is huge, it is difficult to evaluate in practice even
using auction theory since there exists no mathematically optimal strategy for successful bidding, and non-trivial
patterns are sought.
Categories and Subject Descriptors (according to ACM CCS): H.5.0 [Information Interfaces and Presentation ]: —
1. Introduction
Many of the successful Internet companies such as eBay,
Amazon and Google support business models that were
largely not possible before the widespread adoption of the
Internet. eBay dominates the auction field to the point where
it is used by economists to compare with theoretical auction
findings [RO02]. eBay uses proxy bidding, which has been
studied extensively.
More recently, a new auction business model has arisen:
the pay-per-bid auction or, more colloquially, a penny auc-
tion. In this model, an item is initially offered by the site
at a low starting price. Each bid placed raises the price of
the item by a small increment and costs the bidder a small
amount of money. The auction is won by the bidder who
places the final bid, who must then pay the current price of
the item. This process is made clearer with an example: a
camera with a retail price of £300 is offered for sale at an
initial price of £1. Each bid costs £1 and raises the price
of the item by £0.20. At the end of the auction, 450 bids
have been made, at a total cost of £450. The final price of
the item is £(1+ 450× 0.20) = £91. The site earns a profit
of £(91+ 450− 300) = £241 on the item (80% of its retail
price) and the winning bidder makes a saving of £209, mi-
nus the price of the bids he or she placed. The other bidders
receive nothing.
The ideal strategy is to place a single bid at the very end
of the auction. However, each bid extends the time of the
auction, so guaranteeing the last bid is not possible. There is
no optimal strategy based on the rules of the system. Thus,
the analysis of this data is complex: it is a huge dataset and
non-trivial patterns are sought.
We propose a visual analytic solution; whereby the re-
searcher can view the data visually, explore different scenar-
ios, they can drill down into the data to display quantitative
results and explore several hypothesis. This paper presents
an analysis of user success, we first visualize the data using
traditional techniques, which do not allow us to understand
the data fully, thus we present a new tool for behavioural
analysis in individual auctions, which enables us to initiate
new insight into the data.
2. Related Work
Since pay-to-bid auctions represent a relatively new busi-
ness model and consequently there is a significant lack of
research focused on these specific systems, especially in the
visual domain. However, there has been some analysis of
other auction sites, and there has been some work that sta-
tistically analyses auctions with accompanying visual depic-
tions.
Several researchers have collected data by scraping the
Swoopo website [Aug09, PPT10, BMZ10]. They have anal-
ysed auction-level information (winner, number of bids
placed, item and so on), but are less certain about bid-level
data. In fact, Byers et al. [BMZ10] state that in situations
c© The Eurographics Association 2011.
R. Walker et al. / Behaviour in Pay-Per-Bid Auctions
where several automated bidding agents provided by the site
are operating, they are unable to track all bids, and they ex-
clude such auctions from their analysis. Although this cer-
tainly simplifies the analysis, it weakens the generality of
their conclusions substantially.
Our work differs from these researchers in two important
ways: first, the data used is provided directly by the site op-
erator and is both complete (every bid in every auction) and
much richer (additional information not shown to users is
also available). This allows much stronger conclusions about
behaviour to be drawn. Furthermore, while the site consid-
ered falls into the general category of pay-per-bid auction
sites, the model operated differs from most other pay-per-bid
sites. Users must buy bids before they can use them at auc-
tion, and bids can be bought directly from the site or through
a pay-per-bid auction. Bids, then, operate as a virtual cur-
rency within the site, and the market price for a bid fluctu-
ates over time. Second, the focus of this work is solely on
analysing user behaviour in real data through visual means.
There are many examples of visual analysis of tempo-
ral datasets, for instance, Wongsuphasawat and Shneider-
man [WS09] present a strategy and visualization method to
compare across different categorical datasets. However there
has been little interactive visual analysis performed on auc-
tion data. Some work has been achieved to statistically anal-
yse auction data and depict it through scatter plots, tree-maps
and other static visual depictions [SJ05, HJS06].
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Figure 1: Average bid prices by month. The price of bids
initially rose steeply - the low initial price was due to free
bids awarded to early signups and then stabilised towards
the end of the year. The impact of this variable pricing is
visible in user behaviour, as discussed in Section 6.
3. Data Description
The data for this project was provided under agreement with
the site operators for a total of 1,626 auctions and 732,061
bids, from September 2009 to June 2010. The data was pro-
vided with anonymised user login times and a list of auctions
that each user was bidding in. For reasons of commercial
sensitivity, the site is not identified in this paper. The site it-
self operates broadly as described in Section 1. In common
with many other sites, an automated bidding agent allows
users to automate their bidding process by providing a start
price, a maximum end price and the number of bids to place.
Bids can be purchased in two ways: either directly from
the site at a fixed price, or through a pay-per-bid auction for a
pack of bids, using bids already purchased. This virtual cur-
rency system complicates the system considerably. In auc-
tions, each user may have paid a different amount for each
bid they place. In fact, the average price of bids won at auc-
tion is 1.3 while the price of bids purchased directly is 3.3.
The situation is further complicated by lagniappe bids —
additional free bids awarded to a user. Combining these two
affects gives an adjusted price-per-bid over time as shown in
Figure 1.
4. User Analytics
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Figure 3: Histogram of number of auction wins for the 542
users (from a total of 8,097) who have won at least one auc-
tion. While most users in this group win only once, the mean
is 2.92 wins and the standard deviation is 5. Hence, a small
number of users win a significantly larger number of auc-
tions, and in fact one user has 70 wins in this dataset.
The distribution of wins for the data is shown in Figure 3.
Most users of the site have won no auctions, then from one
win onwards the frequency of occurrence seems to undergo
exponential decay. It is startling, though, to note that the top
twenty users (less than one percent of total) have won 31% of
auctions. Clearly, there are differences in auction win rates.
To quantify these differences, it is helpful to define a metric
for success rate.
The most obvious definition of a success rate in an auction
system would be wins/auctions bid in. In a pay-per-bid auc-
tion, this is problematic because fees are paid for each bid,
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Figure 2: Possible candidates for success metrics: (a) wins over auctions, (b) wins over bids placed (c) wins over bids placed
ignoring bids and wins on auctions for packs of bids, and (d) profit per bid. Each is normalised to the range 0-1.
not for each auction entered. Another possibility is wins/total
bids placed. By this definition, successful users are those
who use their bids efficiently. However, this definition ne-
glects the affect of the virtual currency: since packs of bids
can be bought at auction (the virtual equivalent of selling
money at a profit), it can be argued that both bids placed
and wins in auctions for packs of bids should be excluded
from this calculation. A more economic slant on the situa-
tion would consider profit to the user from his or her bid-
ding habits. To calculate this, for each user, for each auction
won, the final price paid for the item and the cost of the bids
used to win it are subtracted from the retail price of the item.
Summing these profits for each user and dividing by the total
number of bids placed gives yet another success ratio. The
values of these four metrics for users with more than 3 wins
are shown in Figure 2.
5. Auction Visual Analysis Tool
An interactive auction analysis tool was developed for this
work to support the analytic process. An example visual-
ization produced by this tool is shown in Figure 4. Start-
ing at the top left, each new participating bidder is given a
unique row, with successive bids represented as nodes pro-
gressing horizontally along the auction timeline. Each node
is coloured by bid type - manual, auto bid, manual bonus or
auto bid lagniappe.
The tool allows for interactive scrolling and zooming,
which facilitates intuitive navigation of the data. One of the
challenges is that the repeated bidding patterns waste space.
Thus, when zoomed out, repeated bidding patterns up to a set
depth are automatically abstracted and labelled by the num-
ber of repetitions, thereby compressing the visualization.
The tool also allows filtering of auctions by bidder and
winner id. This allows the comparison of bidding patterns
between individual auctions, and hence can help identify the
evolution of bidding strategies by tracking a single user over
time.
6. Visual Analysis of Strategies and Tactics
This tool has been used to glean some fascinating insights
into strategic and tactical changes in behaviour by examin-
ing a successful user (named X). With a profit per bid of
more than 6, X has a total of 46 wins. Moreover, X’s be-
haviour over multiple auctions and within individual auc-
tions shows a clear evolution over time. Initially, X wins
low-to-mid value items such as compact cameras and games
consoles. X begins auctions using manual bids to attempt to
gauge the level of competition, then switches to the auto-
mated bidding agent only at the conclusion. But over time, a
shift is observable away from this mixed tactic to the use of
the automated agent throughout the entire auction, and from
low value wins to higher value items such as DSLR cameras
and laptops. Our tool visualizes this trend in Figure 4.
This shift seems counter-intuitive - moving from a more
advanced set of tactics to a simpler one - but by also exam-
ining X’s behaviour over multiple auctions, elements of a
pattern become visible. The first of these is that 29 of X’s 46
wins are for packs of bids sold at auction. This has the ef-
fect of substantially reducing the cost per bid in accordance
with Figure 1. The second is that X bids on multiple items
at the same time, and the previous mixed strategy cannot be
employed in this case. In fact, towards the end of the data
set available, X’s strategy is to win five or six packs of bids
first and then bid on (and win) one high value item before
repeating the process. Aggressive bidding on these packs of
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Figure 4: Auction behaviour for user X. Bids are shown as circles coloured by type, and the auction time runs from left to
right. Bids from a user are shown along the same horizontal line, X’s bids are shown outlined in red, and the numbers and
shaded rectangles indicate repeated bidding patterns. (a) shows an auction win from early March. X initially bids manually
before switching to the automated bidding agent for the final stages of the auction. (b) shows an auction win from late May.
Here, X uses the automated agent for the entire auction - a tactical change made possible by a reduced cost of bids, achieved
by a strategic switch to obtaining bids at auction. This tactic also allows X to bid simultaneously in several auctions.
bids also has the effect of increasing the average bid price
for other users, by reducing the availability of cheaper bids.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
While this paper presents preliminary results of a continu-
ing project, some initial conclusions can be drawn. Trends
of the data, such as the evolving strategy and changing tac-
tics of person X (Section 6) were only discovered through a
strategic, interactive visual analysis of the data. It was impor-
tant to generate a visualization that works at different levels
of abstraction, and methods to compare and highlight and
search different people and bid types was important.
There are still many challenges, including the visualiza-
tion and analysis of the virtual currency, a look at timing
and sequences of auctions and an analysis of the impact of
user reputation on auction behaviour. Finally, there are many
commercial implications for this analysis such as visualizing
fraudulent behaviour.
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